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Digital signatures play an important role in software distribution, modern communication and
financial transactions, where it is important to detect forgery and tampering. Signatures are a cryp-
tographic technique for validating the authenticity and integrity of messages, software, or digital
documents. The security of currently used classical schemes relies on computational assumptions.
Quantum digital signatures (QDS), on the other hand, provide information-theoretic security based
on the laws of quantum physics. Recent work on QDS [1, 2] shows that such schemes do not re-
quire trusted quantum channels and are unconditionally secure against general coherent attacks.
However, in practical QDS, just as in quantum key distribution (QKD), the detectors can be sub-
jected to side-channel attacks, which can make the actual implementations insecure. Motivated by
the idea of measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD), we present a
measurement-device-independent QDS (MDI-QDS) scheme, which is secure against all detector side-
channel attacks. Based on the rapid development of practical MDI-QKD, our MDI-QDS protocol
could also be experimentally implemented, since it requires a similar experimental setup.
I. INTRODUCTION
Digital signatures are techniques for guaranteeing the
authenticity and integrity of a message. They play a sig-
nificant role for example in financial transactions, soft-
ware distribution, and e-mail. Signature schemes allow a
sender to exchange messages with many recipients, with
the assurance that the messages cannot be forged or tam-
pered with. In addition, signed messages are also trans-
ferable, and cannot be repudiated. Transferability means
that a message, which is accepted by an honest recipient,
will also be accepted by another recipient if the message is
forwarded. Non-repudiation is related to transferability
and means that a sender cannot successfully deny having
sent a signed message.
Classical digital signature schemes rely on public-key
encryption. The security of such protocols is based on
the assumed computational difficulty of inverting certain
cryptographic functions. For example, an algorithm that
is widely used for generating digital signatures is the
Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) [3] cryptosystem, which
relies on the difficulty of factoring the product of two
large prime numbers. However, if a quantum computer
is built, this may threaten the security of such protocols.
This is a main motivation for developing unconditionally
secure signature schemes [4, 5], including quantum digi-
tal signature (QDS) schemes [6–10]. The latter are essen-
tially quantum versions of Lamport’s one-time signature
scheme [11], and can offer information-theoretic security
relying on the fundamental laws of quantum physics.
Previous QDS schemes [7–10] improved on the seminal
work in [6] by removing the need for quantum memory.
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Wallden et.al. [12] proposed more practical QDS schemes
which could be realized using QKD [13] components. In
these QDS schemes, Alice encodes her signatures in quan-
tum states, and sends a copy of each state to both Bob
and Charlie. Bob and Charlie are only able to gain par-
tial information on the overall signature state, due to
its quantum nature. Until recently, the security analy-
sis of all QDS schemes assumed authenticated quantum
channels. In [1, 2], all trust assumptions on the quantum
channels are removed, which is a significant improvement
compared to the previous schemes.
It is however more challenging to guarantee the secu-
rity of practical implementations of QDS schemes. This is
so because practical realisations do not typically conform
to the requirements imposed by the theory, as real devices
can behave differently from the models considered in the
security proofs. As a result, we have that any imperfec-
tion which is not accounted for might constitute a “side
channel” which could be used by an adversary to render
the QDS scheme insecure. Here, the most critical devices
are arguably the single-photon detectors [14–21]. For ex-
ample, an adversary can use detector loopholes to learn
about a participant’s (say Bob’s) measurement results,
and could then forge a message with Bob. In the con-
text of QKD, detector side-channels can be successfully
removed by means of measurement-device-independent
QKD (MDI-QKD) [22]. In this approach, Alice and Bob
do not perform any measurement but only send quan-
tum signals to be measured. Thus, the advantage of
MDI-QKD is that the legitimate parties need not hold a
measurement device and may treat the measurement ap-
paratus as a “black box”, which may be fully controlled
by Eve. This is important as it eliminates the require-
ment to certify the detectors in a QKD standarization
process. Therefore, the bit strings generated by Alice
and Bob are free from detector side-channel attacks as
2they do not employ any detector. Hence, this only re-
quires Alice and Bob to characterize the quantum states
which they send through the channel. This characteriza-
tion should take place in a protected environment outside
the influence of the adversary, which in principle is feasi-
ble. Since the invention of MDI-QKD, such schemes have
been very actively studied both theoretically [23–26] and
experimentally [27–32].
In this paper, we present a QDS protocol which elimi-
nates all detector side-channel attacks by employing the
concept of measurement-device-independence. This is
desirable for actual practical use of QDS schemes. The
main contribution of this work is to adapt the rigor-
ous security proof of MDI-QKD given in [26], taking
into account finite-size effects, to the QDS protocol pro-
posed in [1]. The resulting security proof is valid against
general forging and repudiation attacks. Long-distance
implementation of MDI-QKD [27–32] has been recently
achieved, and the experimental parameters allowing for
MDI-QKD could equally well allow for implementation
of our QDS protocol. Hence, we envisage not just a long-
distance implementation of a QDS protocol, but an im-
plementation that is secure against detector side-channel
attacks.
II. THE PROTOCOL
We outline our protocol for three parties, with a
sender, Alice, and two recipients Bob and Charlie. The
set-up for MDI-QDS is illustrated in Fig. 1. We as-
sume that between Alice and Bob, and between Alice
and Charlie, there exist authenticated classical channels.
There is no need for “direct” quantum channels between
Alice and Bob, between Alice and Charlie, nor between
Bob and Charlie. Each party has an untrusted and im-
perfect quantum channel with the relay (Eve). Bob and
Charlie share a MDI-QKD link, which can be used to
transmit classical messages in full secrecy. This is sepa-
rately indicated in the figure, but could also be realised
with Eve as relay. Any classical secret communication
channel between Bob and Charlie would in fact suffice in
place of this MDI-QKD link. We will describe the pro-
cedure for signing a one-bit message. For signing longer
messages, the procedure can be suitably iterated, mean-
ing that the signature length scales linearly with message
length.
Alice, Bob and Charlie each use a laser source to gen-
erate quantum signals that are diagonal in the Fock
basis. Sources producing such signals include attenu-
ated laser diodes emitting phase-randomised weak co-
herent pulses (WCPs), triggered spontaneous paramet-
ric down-conversion sources and practical single-photon
sources. The scheme makes use of a measurement-
device-independent key generating protocol (MDI-KGP),
performed in pairs separately by Alice-Bob and Alice-
Charlie; see Section III for more details. The purpose of
such an MDI-KGP scheme is to use the noisy untrusted
quantum channels to generate two correlated bit strings,
one for each participant in an MDI-KGP. The noise level
is defined in terms of the relative Hamming distance be-
tween these strings. When the noise level is below a tol-
erated value, the relative Hamming distance between the
respective strings of the participants is smaller than the
relative Hamming distance between any string that an
eavesdropper could produce, and the participant’s string.
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FIG. 1. A schematic diagram of a setup for MDI-QDS. Al-
ice, Bob and Charlie prepare quantum signals in different
BB84 polarisation states, using a polarisation modulator (Pol-
Mod). In addition, they generate decoy-states with an inten-
sity modulator (Decoy-IM). The signals are then sent to an
untrusted party Eve, who acts like a relay and is supposed to
perform a Bell state measurement, which projects the incom-
ing signals into a Bell state. The channels between Alice-Eve,
Bob-Eve and Charlie-Eve are quantum channels (QC). Eve
performs the measurement separately for the pairs Alice-Bob
and Alice-Charlie. Bob and Charlie share a MDI-QKD link
(grey channel), which can be used to transmit classical mes-
sages in full secrecy. The pairs Alice-Bob and Alice-Charlie
have pairwise authenticated classical channels (CC) indicated
as dashed lines, through which they can communicate their
basis settings for the different key positions.
The QDS scheme above is related to the one proposed
in [1], with a difference in the KGP. It comprises of two
stages, a distribution stage, where all quantum commu-
nication takes place, and a messaging stage, which can
occur much later, and where only classical communica-
tion is used.
A. Distribution stage
(1) For each possible future message m=0 or 1, Alice
uses the MDI-KGP to generate four different correlated
bit strings, AB0 , A
B
1 , A
C
0 , A
C
1 , each one of length L. The
3superscript denotes the participant with whom Alice
performed the MDI-KGP, and the subscript represents
the future message, which is to be decided later by
her. Bob holds the strings KB0 ,K
B
1 and Charlie holds
the strings KC0 ,K
C
1 . Because of the KGP, it will be
guaranteed that AB0 contains fewer mismatches with K
B
0
than does any string produced by an eavesdropper, and
similarly for the other pairs of strings. Alice’s signature
for the future message m will be Sigm = (A
B
m, A
C
m). The
fact that only Alice knows all signatures for a message
m protects the protocol against forging.
(2) For each future message, Bob and Charlie symmetrize
their keys. This is done by each of them choosing at ran-
dom half of the bit values in their keys (KBm,K
C
m) and
sending these bit values (as well as the corresponding
positions) to the other participant using their secret clas-
sical channel. This will ensure that Alice cannot make
Bob and Charlie disagree on the validity of a signature, if
a message is forwarded from Bob to Charlie or vice versa
in the messaging stage. If Bob (or Charlie) chooses to for-
ward an element of KBm (or K
C
m) in the distribution stage
to Charlie (or Bob), he will not, if he is honest, further
use it to check the validity of a signature. Bob and Char-
lie will only use the bits they did not forward, and those
received from the other participant. This is not strictly
necessary, but simplifies the analysis of repudiation by
a dishonest Alice in that from Alice’s point of view, the
probabilities are equal for Bob and Charlie to check a
particular key bit. We denote their symmetrized keys by
SBm and S
C
m, with the superscript indicating whether the
key is held by Bob or Charlie. Bob (and Charlie) keep a
record of whether an element in SBm (S
C
m) came directly
from Alice or whether it was forwarded to him by Charlie
(or Bob).
Each of the symmetrized strings held by Bob and Char-
lie now contains half of KBm and half of K
C
m. For each fu-
ture possible messagem, Bob and Charlie each have a bit
string of length L. Alice has no information on whether
it is Bob’s SBm or Charlie’s S
C
m that contains a particular
element of the string (KBm,K
C
m), which is of length 2L.
This protects against repudiation. Bob has access to all
of KBm and half of K
C
m. He does not know the other half
of KCm which Charlie chose to keep. This protects the
protocol against forging by Bob (and similarly against
forging by Charlie).
B. Messaging stage
(1) To send a signed one-bit message m, Alice sends
(m,Sigm) to the desired recipient (say Bob).
(2) Bob checks whether (m,Sigm) matches his S
B
m,
and records the number of mismatches he finds. He
separately checks the part of his key received directly
from Alice and the part of the key received from Charlie.
If there are fewer than sa(L/2) mismatches in both
halves of the key, where sa < 1/2 is a small threshold
determined by the observed experimental parameters
(see Appendix D for more details) and the desired
security level of the protocol, then Bob accepts the
message.
(3) To forward the message to Charlie, Bob forwards the
pair (m,Sigm) that he received from Alice.
(4) Charlie tests for mismatches in a similar way, but
using a different threshold in order to protect against re-
pudiation by Alice. He accepts the forwarded message
if the number of mismatches in both halves of his key
is below sv(L/2) where sv is another threshold, with
0 < sa < sv < 1/2. An important and necessary fea-
ture of unconditionally secure signature schemes [4, 33]
is that the recipients have to use different thresholds or
acceptance criteria for messages received directly from
the sender and for forwarded messages.
III. MEASUREMENT-DEVICE-INDEPENDENT
KEY GENERATION PROTOCOL
MDI-QKD protocols [22, 26, 34] are schemes that re-
move all detector side-channel attacks. This is very im-
portant when we consider detector loopholes in conven-
tional QKD implementations [14, 21]. Similarly, the key
generation protocol, which is part of the QDS scheme
we are describing, can be made measurement-device-
independent. Essentially, Alice and Bob (or Alice and
Charlie) only perform the quantum part of the MDI-
QKD scheme to generate raw different keys (the ABm and
KBm described above) with imperfectly correlated and not
completely secret bit strings. That is, Alice and Bob do
not perform error correction and privacy amplification.
This is sufficient for quantum signatures, since it is the
number of mismatches with the recipient’s key that mat-
ters for the signature protocol; perfectly correlated, per-
fectly secret strings are not necessary. The aim is to show
that Λ(ABm,K
B
m) < Λ(Eguess,K
B
m) except with negligible
probability, where Λ(x, y) is the Hamming distance be-
tween x and y, and Eguess is Eve’s attempt at guessing
KBm. It can also be possible that the adversary Eve is
Charlie (for the KGP performed between Alice and Bob,
and for the KGP performed by Alice and Charlie, Eve
could be Bob). The security of the signature protocol is
proved in Sec. IV.
The underlying MDI-QKD protocol, upon which the
KGP is built, is the decoy-state BB84 protocol using
phase-randomized WCPs considered in [22]. We follow
the steps of the protocol in [26], using the Z basis for key
generation, but do not proceed with error correction and
privacy amplification.
The different steps of the MDI-KGP are as follows.
(1) State preparation: Alice and Bob repeat the first
two steps of the protocol for i = 1, ..., N until the con-
ditions in the Sifting stage are met. For each i, Al-
4ice chooses an intensity a ∈ {as, ad1 , ad2}, a basis α ∈
{Z,X}, and a random bit r ∈ {0, 1} with probability
pa,α/2. Here as (adj where j ∈ {1, 2}) is the intensity of
the signal (decoy) states. Next, she generates a quantum
signal (e.g, a phase-randomized WCP) of intensity a pre-
pared in the basis state of α given by r. Similarly, Bob
does the same. Alice and Bob then send their states to
Eve via the quantum channel.
(2) Measurement: If Eve is honest, she makes a
Bell state measurement of the signals she has received.
Whether Eve is honest or not, she informs Alice and Bob
through a public channel of whether or not her measure-
ment was successful. If successful, she declares the Bell
state that is obtained.
(3) Sifting: If Eve reports a successful result, Alice
and Bob communicate through an authenticated chan-
nel their intensity and basis settings. For each Bell state
k, we define two groups of sets: Za,bk and X
a,b
k . Z
a,b
k is a
set that identifies signals where Eve declares a Bell state
k and Alice and Bob have selected the intensities a and
b and the basis Z. Similarly, Xa,bk is a set that identi-
fies signals where Eve declares a Bell state k and Alice
and Bob have selected the intensities a and b and the ba-
sis X . The protocol is repeated until |Za,bk | ≥ Na,bk and
|Xa,bk | ≥ Ma,bk ∀a, b, k [37]. After this, Bob flips part of
his bits to correctly correlate them with those of Alice.
This is shown in Table I.
Bell state reported by Eve
Alice’s & Bob’s basis
∣
∣ψ−
〉 ∣∣ψ+
〉 ∣∣φ−
〉 ∣∣φ+
〉
Z basis Bit flip Bit flip – –
X basis Bit flip – Bit flip –
TABLE I. Processing of data in the sifting stage. The Bell
states are defined as
∣
∣ψ−
〉
= 1√
2
(|HV 〉 − |V H〉),
∣
∣ψ+
〉
=
1√
2
(|HV 〉 + |V H〉),
∣
∣φ+
〉
= 1√
2
(|HH〉 + |V V 〉) and
∣
∣φ−
〉
=
1√
2
(|HH〉 − |V V 〉).
(4) Parameter Estimation: Alice and Bob use nk ran-
dom bits from Zas,bsk to form the code bit strings Zk and
Z ′k, respectively. The remaining Rk bits from Zas,bsk are
used to compute the error rate Eas,bsk =
1
Rk
∑
l rl ⊕ rl′
where rl and rl′ are Alice’s and Bob’s bits respectively.
The bit string of length Rk is used to estimate the
correlation between Alice and Bob’s strings generated
from the Z basis, after which they are discarded. If
Eas,bsk > Etol ∀k, then Alice and Bob abort the pro-
tocol. If Eas,bsk ≤ Etol, Alice and Bob use Za,bk and Xa,bk
to estimate nk,0, nk,1 and ek,1. The parameter nk,0 is
a lower bound for the number of bits in Z ′k,keep where
Bob sent a vacuum state. Z ′k,keep is the part of Z ′k
which he chooses to keep with himself while he forwards
the other remaining part, Z ′k,forward, to Charlie during
the key symmetrization process. That is, |Z ′k,keep| =
|Z ′k,forward| = nk/2. In a similar way, nk,1 is a lower
bound for the number of bits in Z ′k,keep where Alice and
Bob sent a single-photon state. ek,1 is an upper bound
for the single-photon phase error rate. If ek,1 ≥ etol,
the code bit strings Zk and Z ′k are discarded, and the
protocol is aborted only if ek,1 ≥ etol ∀k.
Eve
BS
PBS PBS
D1H D1V D2V D2H
Alice Bob/Charlie
FIG. 2. A schematic diagram of Eve’s measurement device.
The combination of polarising beam splitters (PBSs) and a
50:50 beam splitter (BS) projects the incoming signals from
Alice and Bob/Charlie into horizontal (H) and vertical (V)
polarisation states. A joint click on the single-photon detec-
tors D1H and D2V , or D1V and D2H , represents a projection
into the Bell state
∣
∣ψ−
〉
, while a joint click in D1H and D1V ,
or D2V and D2H , indicates a projection into the Bell state∣
∣ψ+
〉
.
We will assume that Eve implements her Bell state
measurement using linear optics. The measurement
setup is illustrated in Fig. 2; it is able to identify two
of the four Bell states. Alice and Bob choose Zk and
Z ′k as their respective secret keys ABm and KBm of length
L (where L = nk), for which they obtained the small-
est phase error rate ek,1. Here, we will consider a finite
number of states that are sent and measured, where Eve
is allowed to perform general coherent attacks.
Our strategy is to find Eve’s information in terms of
the smooth min-entropy [35], and then use it to bound
the probability that she can make a signature declara-
tion making fewer errors than a certain value. We begin
by finding Eve’s smooth min-entropy on Bob’s bit string
Z ′k,keep, by following the same strategy as in [1]. In spite
of the fact that the KGP is built on MDI-QKD, the se-
curity analysis for the MDI-KGP does not follow directly
from the security of the MDI-QKD protocol. One reason
is that the goal of an adversary in the signature protocol
is different from that of an eavesdropper in MDI-QKD.
For the signature protocol, what matters is the number of
mismatches with a recipient’s key; for QKD, what mat-
ters is the information an eavesdropper can hold about a
key. These are related but not identical.
Previous work [1] followed [36] to find Eve’s smooth
min-entropy in a similar way as for decoy-state QKD.
Another important difference from QKD is that in the
signature protocol, Bob effectively gives the extra infor-
5mation Z ′k,forward to Eve (with respect to forging with
Bob, Charlie can be “Eve”). In a similar way, let us
denote the classical random variables Rk and Θ as the
information gained by Eve from parameter estimation
and basis declarations for all the pulses sent by Alice
and Bob, respectively. Since Bob, if he is honest, does
not use Z ′k,forward, this could be treated as the part of
the string Rk that is sacrificed for parameter estimation,
as explained in [38]. We combine all of Eve’s information
into one quantum system living in the Hilbert space HE .
This comprises the space containing Eve’s ancilla quan-
tum system following her general attack, HE′ , as well
as the spaces containing the states encoding the strings
Rk,Θ and Z ′k,forward. Then, according to [26], Eve’s
smooth min-entropy, which quantifies the average proba-
bility that she guesses Z ′k,keep within a certain threshold
using the optimal strategy with access to Ek, is given by
Hεkmin(Z ′k,keep|Ek)ρ ≥
nk,0 + nk,1 [1− h(ek,1)]− 2 log2
2
ε′kεˆk
,
(1)
where εk ≥ ε′k + εˆk and ρ is the state shared by Eve
and the part of the key that Bob kept and did not for-
ward. We are interested in a regime where the first two
terms on the RHS of equation (1) are much larger than
the log2 term as ε
′
k and εˆk are typically of the order say
10−5 − 10−10. Therefore, we arrive at the following ap-
proximation of equation (1):
Hεkmin(Z ′k,keep|Ek)ρ ' nk,0 + nk,1 [1− h(ek,1)] . (2)
Appendix A provides a brief analysis of the estimation
of the parameters nk,0, nk,1, and ek,1, and Appendix B
briefly describes the steps involved to obtain equation (1).
Note that equation (2) is similar to equation (1) ob-
tained in [1]. The next task is to bound the number of
errors that Eve is likely to make when guessing Bob’s key,
given the bound on her smooth min-entropy. For this, we
use Proposition 1 in [1] and follow the same argumenta-
tion.
Proposition 1 [1] If Bob and Eve share the state ρ then,
for any eavesdropping strategy, Eve’s average probability
of making at most r mistakes when guessing Z ′k,keep can
be upper bounded as
〈pr〉 ≤
r∑
m=0
(nk
2
m
)
2−H
εk
min
(Z′k,keep|Ek)ρ + εk. (3)
The proof of this proposition follows the lines introduced
in Appendix B of [1]. For large nk, it can be shown from
Markov’s inequality that equation (3) implies
Pr(Eve makes fewer than r errors) := pr ≤ g, (4)
except with probability at most
pF :=
1
g
(
2−
nk
2
{ck,0+ck,1[1−h(ek,1)]−h(2r/nk)} + εk
)
, (5)
where ck,i := 2nk,i/nk is the lower bound on the count
rate for the Z basis pulses containing i photons. There-
fore, we arrive at the condition that determines whether
or not Eve is able to make fewer than r errors with non-
negligible probability, given as
ck,0 + ck,1[1− h(ek,1)]− h(2r/nk) > 0. (6)
If the condition holds, then nk can be increased to make
Eve’s probability of making fewer than r errors arbitrar-
ily small. We define pE by the equation
ck,0 + ck,1[1− h(ek,1)]− h(pE) = 0. (7)
The meaning of this is that pE is the minimum rate at
which Eve can make errors for the code string associated
with the Bell state k (except with negligible probability
pF ). Suppose the error rate on the Z basis measurements
between Alice and Bob is upper bounded as Ek. As
long as pE > Ek, there exists a choice of parameters
and a sufficiently large signature length which makes the
protocol secure. This means that MDI-QDS is possible
as long as
ck,0 + ck,1[1− h(ek,1)]− h(Ek) > 0. (8)
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
We will now prove the security of the signature pro-
tocol, i.e. the robustness (probability of an honest run
aborting), security against forging (probability that a re-
cipient generates a signature, not originating from Alice,
that is accepted as authentic) and repudiation (or trans-
ferability) (probability that Alice generates a signature
that is accepted by Bob but then when forwarded, is re-
jected by Charlie). In what follows we assume that Alice-
Bob and Alice-Charlie have each used the MDI-KGP to
generate bit strings of length L = nk, to use in the QDS
protocol described above.
(a) Robustness. Bob rejects a signed message if the
nk
2 bits received from either Alice or Charlie have a mis-
match rate higher than sa with Alice’s signature. We
note that Alice and Bob use a random sample, Rk bits
from Zas,bsk , to obtain the error rate E
as,bs
k . This implies
that the error rate E
as,bs
k between the strings (Zk,keep
and Z ′k,keep) generated using the Z basis satisfies the
inequality [39]
E
as,bs
k ≥ Eas,bsk + µ
(nk
2
, Rk, εPE
)
, (9)
where
µ
(nk
2
, Rk, εPE
)
=
√
(nk2 −Rk + 1) ln( 1εPE )
Rknk
. (10)
This means that the upper bound which we obtain from
equation (9) on the error rate between Alice’s and Bob’s
6strings is true except with a very small probability εPE ,
and this probability can be fixed as small as desired. For
any fixed value of the function µ, the failure probability
decays exponentially fast in the parameter Rk. Then we
set Ek := max{Ek,B , Ek,C}, where Ek,B and Ek,C refer
to the upper bound obtained in equation (9) for the cases
Alice-Bob and Alice-Charlie, and we choose sa such that
sa > Ek. We have that the probability that Bob will find
an error rate higher than sa is bounded by
Pr(Honest Abort) ≤ 2εPE , (11)
where the factor of 2 accounts for the fact that the abort
can be due to either the states received from Alice or the
states received from Charlie.
(b) Security against repudiation. Successful repudia-
tion by Alice means, in the three-party scenario, that
she makes Bob accept a declaration (m,Sigm) that was
sent to him by her, while Charlie rejects the same dec-
laration when Bob forwards it to him (or similarly for
a message forwarded from Charlie to Bob). Intuitively,
security against repudiation follows because of the sym-
metrisation performed by Bob and Charlie using the se-
cret classical channel. Even if Alice knows and can con-
trol the error rates between ABm, A
C
m and K
B
m, K
C
m, she
cannot control whether the errors end up with Bob or
Charlie. After symmetrisation the keys SBm and S
C
m will
each have the same expected number of errors. To re-
pudiate, one key must contain significantly more errors
than the other. Using results from [1], we obtain
Pr(Repudiation) ≤ 2 exp
[
−1
4
(sv − sa)2nk
]
. (12)
For a formal proof, please see Appendix C. Note that
the probability of repudiation decays exponentially as the
length nk of the signature increases.
(c) Security against forging. It is easier for either Bob
or Charlie to forge than it is for any other external party.
Therefore, we will consider forging by an internal party.
In order to forge a message, Bob must give a declara-
tion (m,Sigm) to Charlie that has fewer than svnk/2
mismatches with the (to Bob) unknown half of SCm sent
directly from Alice to Charlie, and also fewer than svnk/2
mismatches with the half he himself forwarded to Char-
lie. An adversarial Bob will obviously be able to meet
the threshold on the part he forwarded to Charlie. We
therefore consider only the unknown half that Charlie re-
ceived directly from Alice. We have that the maximum
rate at which Alice will make errors with Charlie’s key
is given by Ek. From Eq. (7), we also know the mini-
mum rate at which Bob will make errors with the code
string associated with the Bell state k of Charlie’s key;
we have denoted this by pE . Assuming (8) holds, we
choose sv such that Ek < sv < pE . In this case, Char-
lie will likely accept a legitimate signature sent by Alice,
since the upper bound on their error rate, Ek, is less than
the threshold sv. On the other hand, Charlie will likely
reject any dishonest signature declaration by Bob, since
the probability of Bob finding a signature with an error
rate smaller than sv is restricted by (4) as
Pr(Bob makes fewer than svnk/2 errors) := pr ≤ g
(13)
except with probability at most pF given by (5). If the
estimation of the parameter Ek fails, which can happen
with probability εPE , we will assume for simplicity that
Bob is able to successfully forge with certainty. In a
similar way as in [1], we are then able to bound Bob’s
probability of successfully forging as
Pr(Forge) ≤ pF + g + εPE + εk,0 + εk,1 + εk,e. (14)
This equation is valid for any choice of parameters
(g, εPE , εk,0, εk,1, εk,e) greater than 0. Thereby, Bob’s
probability to forge can be made arbitrarily small by
increasing nk. The addition of εPE accounts for the
probability that the upper bound on Ek is incorrect and
εk,0, εk,1 and εk,e are the error probabilities associated
with the estimation of nk,0, nk,1 and ek,1 respectively (see
Appendix A).
V. COMPARISON TO MDI-QKD
According to [26], in MDI-QKD the length lk of the
secret bit string associated to the Bell state k is given by
lk ≤ nk,0 + nk,1[1− h(ek,1)]− leakEC,k − log2
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ǫcor
−2 log2
2
ε′kεˆk
− 2 log2
1
2εk,PA
, (15)
if the protocol is ǫsec-secret, with ǫsec =
∑
k ǫk,sec and
ǫk,sec = 2(ε
′
k+2εk,e+ εˆk)+εk,b+εk,0+εk,1+εk,PA. Here
εk,PA is the failure probability of privacy amplification,
and the term leakEC,k is the information that is revealed
by Alice in the error correction step. The meaning of the
remaining epsilons can be found in [26]. The correctness
of the protocol is guaranteed by the error correction step,
and we say that the protocol is ǫcor-correct if the proba-
bility that Alice’s and Bob’s bit strings are not identical
is not greater than ǫcor. In the asymptotic limit of very
large data blocks, one can neglect certain terms that re-
duce the secret key length and thereby equation (15) can
be rewritten as
lk ≈ nk{ck,0 + ck,1[1− h(ek,1)]} − leakEC,k. (16)
Here, ck,i := nk,i/nk increase the secret key rate, while
nkck,1h(ek,1) and leakEC,k reduce it. These parameters
depend on the sifted key length nk [26]. leakEC,k =
nkζh(E
as,bs
k ), where ζ is referred to as the leakage pa-
rameter, which depends on the value of nk, and h(.) de-
notes the binary Shannon entropy. ζ is assumed to be
1.16 in [26] but can generally be in the range 1.1 - 1.2,
and when nk < 10
5 the parameter ζ may be greater than
7Detectors ηD(%) Y0(×10
−6) Nsig(×10
12) tr(min)
Standard single-photon detectors [40] 14.5 6.02 5.58 93
InGaAs avalanche photodiodes detectors (APD) [32] 30 130 1.8 30
InGaAs/InP APD [41] 55 500 0.87 14.5
Superconducting nanowire single-photon detectors (SNSPDs) [42] 93 1 0.098 1.6
TABLE II. Raw key generation times for various detectors that could be used in a MDI-QDS protocol for a distance of 50 km
and a security threshold of 10−5. The parameters ηD(%), Y0 and Nsig denote respectively the detection efficiency, dark count
rate of Eve’s detectors, and the number of signals that Bob/Charlie sends to Alice during their KGPs. tr is the time taken to
generate the raw key and to estimate tr we assume a source with a pulse rate of 1 GHz.
Detectors Nsig(×10
12) tr(min)
Standard single-photon detectors [40] 10.5 175
InGaAs APD [32] 3.35 55.83
InGaAs/InP APD [41] 1.63 27.1
SNSPDs [42] 0.18 3
TABLE III. Raw key generation times for a distance of 50 km with a security threshold of 10−10. For the definition of the
different parameters, see the caption of Table II.
1.16. Therefore, for a sifted key length nk2 , equation (16)
can be written as
lk ≈ nk
2
{ck,0 + ck,1[1− h(ek,1)]− ζh(Ek)}. (17)
In a similar way as in [1], when we compare equations
(8) and (17), we find that there are Alice-Bob and Alice-
Charlie quantum channels for which quantum signatures
are possible and yet practical MDI-QKD is not, since the
error threshold is less strict for the quantum channels
used to perform the KGP in the signature protocol.
VI. DISCUSSION
In this section, we analyse the number of quantum
transmissions necessary to sign a message with a secu-
rity level of the order of 10−5 and 10−10 respectively. If
the security level of the protocol is of the order of, say,
10−5, then this means that the probabilities of honest
abort, forging and repudiation are all less than 10−5.
Using realistic experimental quantities, we estimate
that a signature length of nk = 8.9 × 106 (for each of
the possible single bit messages 0 and 1) can be used to
securely sign a single bit message, sent over a distance
of 50 km. Essentially, it would require Bob or Charlie
to transmit approximately Nsig = 5.58 × 1012 quantum
states (per bit to be signed) to Alice during their KGPs
(for full details see Appendix D). With a source with a
pulse rate of 1GHz, we can calculate that it would take
approximately 93 minutes to generate a raw key when the
experiment uses standard single-photon detectors with
detection efficiency (ηD) of 14.5%. This is for a security
level of the order of 10−5. By using detectors with higher
detection efficiency we can improve the time of generating
a raw key (tr) since sending a smaller number of signals
(Nsig) is then required to sign a single-bit message.
Table II shows the raw key generation times for vari-
ous detectors that could be used in the protocol. We find
that the most advanced superconducting nanowire single-
photon detectors (SNSPDs) having 93% efficiency [42]
would only require Bob or Charlie to send 6.4× 1010 sig-
nals to perform the protocol with a secure threshold of
the order of 10−5. This would require just above a minute
to generate the raw key. In order to improve the secu-
rity threshold of the protocol (say 10−10), Bob or Charlie
would need to send a higher number of signals compared
to the previous case. Table III shows the raw key gener-
ation times and the number of signals that are required
to send for the protocol to be secure for a threshold of
the order of 10−10.
The protocol is secure to the order of 10−10 for a
distance of 50 km, which in comparison is an improve-
ment over the previous scheme [1] having with a security
threshold of 10−4. The simulation results demonstrate
that even with practical signals (for example, phase-
randomised WCPs) and a finite size of data (say 1011 to
1014 signals) it is possible to perform secure MDI-QDS
(with security threshold 10−10) over long distances (up
to about 150 km). Since the experimental platform for
the implementation of MDI-QKD can also be used for
MDI-QDS with slight modifications, in particular in the
post-processing of measurement results, we expect MDI-
QDS could be widely used in practical QDS systems in
the near future.
VII. CONCLUSION
In summary, we have presented a MDI-QDS protocol
and proven it unconditionally secure against general at-
tacks. It improves on previous quantum signature proto-
cols by removing all detector side-channel attacks. This
8is essentially achieved by adapting the rigorous security
proof of MDI-QKD given in [26], taking into account fi-
nite size effects, to the QDS protocol proposed in [1] and
we have presented that the resulting security proof is
valid against general forging and repudiation attacks.
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Appendix A: Estimation of relevant parameters
In this Appendix we briefly discuss the estimation of
the parameter nk,0. This is a two-step process. First,
we calculate a lower bound for the number of indices
in Zas,bsk where Bob sent a vacuum state. This lower
bound is denoted mk,0. Second, we compute nk,0 from
mk,0 using the Serfling inequality for random sampling
without replacement [39]. The other parameters, nk,1
and ek,1, are also estimated using a similar approach.
A detailed explanation is provided in the supplementary
notes of [26].
We assume that Alice and Bob use two decoy states
each and the photon-number distribution of their signals
is Poissonian. That is, a ∈ A = {as, ad1 , ad2}, with as >
ad1 > ad2 , b ∈ B = {bs, bd1 , bd2}, with bs > bd1 > bd2,
and the probability that Alice (Bob) sends an n-photon
(m-photon) signal when she (he) selects the intensity a
(b) is given by pn|a = e
−aan/n! (pm|b = e
−bbm/m!).
Let Sk,nm denote the number of signals sent by Alice
and Bob with n and m photons respectively, when they
select the basis Z and Eve declares the Bell state k. Now,
for each combination of values n and m, the signal and
decoy states provide a random sample of the population
of all signals containing n and m photons respectively.
Therefore, one can apply the standard large deviation
theory technique, in particular a multiplicative form of
the Chernoff bound [26]. Then, if
(
2ε−1a,b
)1/µa,b
k,L ≤ exp
[
3/(4
√
2)]2
]
,
and
(
εˆ−1a,b
)1/µa,b
k,L ≤ exp (1/3) ,
with the parameter µa,bk,L given by
µa,bk,L = |Za,bk | −
√∑
a,b
|Za,bk |/2 ln(1/ǫa,b), (A1)
this implies that
|Za,bk | =
∑
n,m
pa,b|nm,ZSk,nm + δa,b, (A2)
except with error probability γa,b = ǫa,b+εa,b+εˆa,b. Here,
pa,b|nm,Z refers to the conditional probability that Alice
and Bob have selected the intensity settings a and b re-
spectively, given that their signals contain n and m pho-
tons respectively, prepared in the Z basis. The param-
eter δa,b ∈
[
−∆a,b, ∆ˆa,b
]
with ∆a,b = g(|Za,bk |, ε4a,b/16)
and ∆ˆa,b = g(|Za,bk |, εˆ3/2a,b ), and the function g(x, y) =√
2x ln(y−1).
By using similar arguments, the quantity mk,0 can be
written as
mk,0 =
∑
n
pas,bs|n0,ZSk,n0 −∆0, (A3)
except with error probability ε0, where ∆0 =
g
(∑
n pas,bs|n0,ZSk,n0, ε0
)
. To obtain a lower bound for
mk,0, one can minimise equation (A3) given the lin-
ear constraints imposed by equation (A2) ∀a, b. This
is solved both analytically and numerically in the sup-
plementary notes of [26]. Then using Serfling inequality
[39], we find
nk,0 = max
{⌊
nk
2
mk,0
|Zas,bsk |
−nk
2
Λ(|Zas,bsk |,
nk
2
, ε′′k,0)
⌋
, 0
}
,
(A4)
except with error probability
εk,0 ≤ ε′k,0 + ε′′k,0, (A5)
where ε′k,0 ≤ ε0 +
∑
a,b γa,b corresponds to the to-
tal error probability in the estimation of mk,0 and
the function Λ(x, y, z) is defined as Λ(x, y, z) =√
(x− y + 1) ln(z−1)/(2xy).
A similar approach is followed to estimate nk,1 and ek,1
with associated error probabilities εk,1 and εk,e respec-
tively. We obtain
nk,1 = max
{⌊
nk
2
mk,1
|Zas,bsk |
−nk
2
Λ(|Zas,bsk |,
nk
2
, ε′′k,1)
⌋
, 0
}
,
(A6)
except with error probability
εk,1 ≤ ε′k,1 + ε′′k,1, (A7)
where ε′k,1 ≤ ε1 +
∑
a,b γa,b. Here, mk,1 =
pas,bs|11,ZSk,11 − ∆1, except with error probability ε1
9where the parameter ∆1 = g(pas,bs|11,ZSk,11, ε1). Fi-
nally, the parameter ek,1 is given as
ek,1 = min
{⌈
nk,1
(
ek,1
nk,1
)
+ (nk,1 + nk,1)
×Υ(nk,1, nk,1, ε′′′k,e)
⌉
, nk,1
}
,
(A8)
except with error probability
εk,e ≤ ε′k,e + ε′′k,e + ε′′′k,e, (A9)
where the function Υ(x, y, z) is defined as Υ(x, y, z) =√
(x+ 1) ln(z−1)/(2y(x+ y)). The quantity nk,1 is a
lower bound for the number of signals where Alice and
Bob send a single-photon state prepared in the X basis
and where Eve declares the Bell state k, ek,1 is an upper
bound for the total number of errors in these signals, and
ε′k,e and ε
′′
k,e represent, respectively, their associated er-
ror probabilities. For more details about how to calculate
these parameters, please see [26].
We have, therefore, that the error probability associ-
ated with the estimation of the different parameters is
given by εPE+εk,0+εk,1+εk,e, with εPE given by equa-
tion (9).
Appendix B: Eve’s smooth-min entropy
The goal of this Appendix is to derive equation (B2).
The analysis follows the procedure introduced in [26].
For this, let Hεkmin(Z ′k,keep|Ek) denote the smooth min-
entropy which quantifies the average probability that
the adversary guesses Z ′k,keep correctly using the op-
timal strategy with access to Ek. Now the bits of
Z ′k,keep can be distributed among three different strings,
Z ′0k,keep,Z
′1
k,keep and Z
′rest
k,keep. The first string contains bits
where Bob sent a vacuum state, the second where Alice
and Bob sent a single-photon state, and Z ′restk,keep contains
the rest of bits. Using the result of chain rule of en-
tropies [43], we obtain
Hεkmin(Z ′k,keep|Ek) ≥
H
ǫ′k+2ǫ
′′
k+(ǫˆk+2ǫˆ
′
k+ǫˆ
′′
k )
min (Z
′0
k,keepZ
′1
k,keepZ
′rest
k,keep|Ek)
≥ nk,0 +Hǫ
′′
k
min(Z
′1
k,keep|Z
′0
k,keepZ
′rest
k,keepEk)− 2 log2
2
ǫ′kǫˆk
,
(B1)
where εk = ǫ
′
k + 2ǫ
′′
k + (ǫˆk + 2ǫˆ
′
k + ǫˆ
′′
k). Here, it is
taken into consideration that H
ǫˆ′k
min(Z
′rest
k,keep|Z
′0
k,keepEk) ≥
0, and H
ǫˆ′′k
min(Z
′0
k,keep|Ek) ≥ H0min(Z
′0
k,keep|Ek) =
Hmin(Z ′0k,keep) = nk,0. The final part arises as the vac-
uum states contain no information about their bit val-
ues, which are uniformly distributed. In order to get the
lower bound for the termH
ǫ′′k
min(Z
′1
k,keep|Z
′0
k,keepZ
′rest
k,keepEk),
it is considered that Alice and Bob prepare perfect BB84
states. Then, this quantity can be written in terms of
the smooth max-entropy between them, which is directly
bounded by the strength of the correlations [44]. From
the entropy uncertainty relation [35], we obtain
H
ǫ′′k
min(Z
′1
k,keep|Z
′0
k,keepZ
′rest
k,keepEk) ≥ nk,1 −Hǫ
′′
k
max(X 1k |X ′1k )
≥ nk,1 − nk,1h(ek,1).
Using the above equation in equation (B1), we get
Hεkmin(Z ′k,keep|Ek) ≥ nk,0 + nk,1 [1− h(ek,1)]− 2 log2
2
ǫ′k ǫˆk
.
(B2)
We are interested in a regime where the first two terms
on the RHS of equation (B2) are much larger than the
log2 term, as ε
′
k and εˆk are typically of the order say
10−5− 10−10. Therefore, if we neglect this log2 term, we
obtain equation (2) of the main paper,
Hεkmin(Z ′k,keep|Ek) ' nk,0 + nk,1 [1− h(ek,1)] . (B3)
Appendix C: Security against repudiation
We follow the approach in [12]. If Alice tries to
repudiate a message, she sends a declaration (m,Sigm)
which Bob will accept and Charlie will reject. For this
to happen, Bob must accept both the elements that
Alice sent directly to him, and the elements that Charlie
forwarded to him. In order for Charlie to reject he needs
only to reject either the elements he received from Alice,
or the elements Bob forwarded to him (or both). Intu-
itively, security against repudiation follows because of
the symmetrisation performed by Bob and Charlie using
the secret classical channel. In the distribution stage,
to send the future message m, Alice uses the MDI-KGP
with Bob and Charlie to generate strings of length
nk = L. Suppose that Bob holds the string (b1, ..., bL)
and Charlie holds the string (c1, ..., cL). Now, for
simplicity, we consider that Alice has full power and we
assume that later on, in the messaging stage, she is able
to fully control the number of mismatches her signature
declaration contains with (b1, ..., bL) and (c1, ..., cL). Let
us denote the mismatch rates by eB and eC respectively.
Then, the symmetrisation process means that Bob and
Charlie will randomly (and unknown to Alice) receive
L/2 elements of the other’s string. We aim to show
that any choice of eC and eB leads to an exponentially
decaying probability of repudiation. Then we have two
cases as in [12]:
Case 1: First, let us assume that eC > sa. In this
case, Bob receives L/2 elements from the set {c1, ..., cL},
which contains exactly eCL mismatches with Alice’s
future declaration. In order to accept the message, Bob
must get fewer than saL/2 errors. Using [45] we can
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bound the probability that Bob gets fewer than saL/2
mismatches as
Pr(Bob gets less than saL/2 mismatches from Charlie)
≤ exp[−(eC − sa)2L].
(C1)
To repudiate, Alice must make Bob accept the message,
which means that Bob must accept both the part
received from Alice and the part received from Charlie.
Since Pr(A ∩ B) ≤ min{Pr(A), P r(B)} the probability
of repudiation must be less than or equal to the above
expression, and so must also decrease exponentially.
Case 2: Suppose eC ≤ sa. In this case, if eB > sa,
the above argument shows that it is highly likely that
Bob will reject the message, so we examine only the
case where eB ≤ sa. Consider first the set {b1, ..., bL}.
We can use the same arguments as above to bound the
probability of selecting more than svL/2 mismatches as
Pr(Charlie gets more than svL/2 mismatches from Bob)
≤ exp[−(sv − eB)2L].
(C2)
Then, Alice succeeds if Charlie finds more than svL/2
mismatches either from the set {b1, ..., bL} or the set
{c1, ..., cL}. Using Pr(A ∪ B) ≤ Pr(A) + Pr(B), we
can see that, for the choice of eB, eC ≤ sa, we have
Pr(Charlie gets more than svL/2 mismatches)
≤ 2 exp[−(sv − sa)2L].
(C3)
So again, the probability of Alice successfully repudiating
decreases exponentially in the size of the signature, and
Alice’s best strategy would be to pick eB = eC =
1
2 (sv +
sa), in which case
Pr(Repudiation) ≤ 2 exp
[
−1
4
(sv − sa)2L
]
. (C4)
Appendix D: Calculation of the number of quantum
transmissions required per signed bit
1. Parameters and constraints
Similar to [1], the correctness and security of the pro-
tocol depends on the three equations (11), (12) and
(14), which in turn depend on the choice of parame-
ters sa and sv. The parameters are considered such that
Ek < sa < sv < pE . We say that Ek is the maxi-
mum of the worst-case error rates that Alice makes with
Bob’s key (found from the Alice-Bob MDI-KGP), and
the worst-case error rates Alice makes with Charlie’s key
(found from the Alice-Charlie MDI-KGP). Similarly, pE
is the minimum of the adversary’s error rates found from
the Alice-Bob and Alice-Charlie MDI-KGP. We follow
[1] to choose the parameters that minimise the number
of quantum transmissions required per signed bit. This
will be larger than the signature length, L, due to factors
such as channel loss, detection efficiency and parameter
estimation procedures. Because of this, Bob will have
to transmit more than L quantum states to generate a
signature of length L.
In the next section, we will calculate the length of the
signature and the number of quantum transmissions nec-
essary to sign a message with a security level of 10−5.
This means that the probabilities of honest abort, forg-
ing and repudiation, given respectively by (11), (14) and
(12), are all less than 10−5. To find the length per possi-
ble one-bit message, of the signature necessary to securely
sign a one-bit message, we must first choose the param-
eters sa and sv. That is, a signature sequence of length
L needs to be transmitted for the possible message “0”,
and for the possible message ‘1”, so that the total signa-
ture sequence has length 2L. Ideally, our choice would
minimise L. We choose to set εPE = 10
−5 and
sa = Ek +
pE − Ek
3
, sv = Ek +
2(pE − Ek)
3
. (D1)
These may not be the optimal choices of these parame-
ters. However, a natural choice would be to choose the
parameters in order to equally partition the gap between
Ek and pE .
2. The number of quantum transmissions required
per signed bit
In this section, we use experimental data provided
by [40] to give an optimal estimate of the number of states
Bob needs to transmit over a 50 km quantum channel to
securely sign a one bit message. We set ǫPE = 10
−5 in
all equations that follow. The experiment in [40] consid-
ers a free-space channel, we assume a fibre-based channel
with a loss coefficient of 0.2 dB/km. Here, we consider
standard single-photon detectors where the detection ef-
ficiency of the relay is 14.5% and the background rate
is 6.02 × 10−6. The overall misalignment in the chan-
nel is assumed to be 1% and the bound is fixed to be
εk = 10
−10. The other parameters involved are:
• Source: 1 GHz pulse rate
• Basis probabilities: pZ = 62.5%, pX = 37.5%.
• Intensity levels: (s, d1, d2) = (0.18, 0.09, 5× 10−4).
• Intensity probabilities: ps = 50%, pd1 = pd2 =
25%.
We consider the total number of signals sent by Bob to
be 5.58×1012, and find the raw key to contain 9.42×106
bit values from Z basis measurement outcomes. Assum-
ing that 5.5% of the detected signals are used for error
rate estimation (Rk = 5.18× 105), we obtain a signature
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length of nk = 8.9 × 106. Of these, Bob will randomly
choose nk/2 = 4.45 × 106 to be Z ′k,keep, another nk/2
will be used as Z ′k,forward.
For the given intensity levels and intensity choice prob-
abilities, we observe an error rate in the Z basis given by
Eas,bsk = 2.07%. This error rate arises from the channel
misalignment together with the dark-count rate of the
detectors. We can then use Eq.(9) to upper bound the
true error rate as E
as,bs
k = 2.39%.
We use Appendix A to estimate the relevant param-
eters by setting all ε as 10−10, and thereby we can cal-
culate the min-entropy. Finally, setting εk = 10
−10, we
get
Hεkmin(Z ′k,keep|Ek) = 8.69× 105. (D2)
Then using (7) we find pE as 3.02%, and so we obtain
sa = 2.60% and sv = 2.81%. Setting g as 10
−5 and sub-
stituting these values into equations (11), (14) and (12),
we find Pr(Honest Abort) = 2.00 × 10−5, Pr(Forge) =
3 × 10−5, and Pr(Repudiation) = 9.857 × 10−5. Thus
we observe that when 5.58× 1012 states are transmitted,
the protocol is secure to a level of the order of 10−5 for a
distance of 50 km. The analysis for the other cases shown
in Tables II and III is done in a similar way.
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